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THE INEQUITABLE CONDUCT DEFENSE IN
PATENT LITIGATION: WHERE WE ARE, WHERE
WE HAVE BEEN, AND WHERE WE SHOULD GO
FROM HERE
Brett Ira Johnson†
Abstract
This paper examines the current status of the inequitable
conduct defense in patent litigation, the historical evolution of the
inequitable conduct defense in patent litigation, and problems and
concerns with the administration of the inequitable conduct defense.
This paper then reviews patent reform legislation and the various
ways in which each would address the issue of inequitable conduct
and opines on the desirability of the different proposals. Finally, this
paper concludes that the inequitable conduct defense should be
eliminated.
In the alternative to the inequitable conduct defense, section 282
of the Patent Act, should be interpreted to presume validity of an
issued patent only when all non-cumulative material information was
considered during examination. This change would serve the purpose
for which inequitable conduct was created: to encourage full
disclosure of all material information to the United States Patent and
Trademark Office, while eliminating the problems and resources
expended with the assertion of the inequitable conduct defense during
patent litigation.

† Brett Ira Johnson practices law in the area of complex litigation. Mr. Johnson
graduated with his J.D., summa cum laude, from the University of Idaho College of Law in 2001
and he graduated with his L.L.M. in Trade Regulation, with a concentration in intellectual
property, from New York University College of Law in 2010. Mr. Johnson is licensed to
practice in Nevada, Utah, Idaho, and before the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Mr.
Johnson would like to extend his gratitude to Dr. Michael VanAuker, Teri Karobonik, Darryl
Ong, Chris Dombkowski, and the entire Santa Clara Computer and High Technology Law
Journal for their invaluable edits and insight.
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INTRODUCTION

Inequitable conduct is a judicially created equitable doctrine that
was intended to provide incentive to patentees to fully disclose
material information to the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”)
during prosecution of patent applications.1 Under the doctrine, patent
claims could be rendered unenforceable in subsequent litigation if a
patentee failed to disclose material information.2 To prove inequitable
conduct, the challenging party must show that the patentee: (1) made
an affirmative misrepresentation of material fact or submitted false
material information; and (2) intended to deceive the PTO.3 A
showing of inequitable conduct renders all of the claims of a patent
and potentially all claims of related applications unenforceable.4
The expansion of the inequitable conduct doctrine has caused
concern among patent experts5 and among judges on the Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals.6
[T]he habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost every major
patent case has become an absolute plague. Reputable lawyers
seem to feel compelled to make the charge against other reputable
lawyers on the slenderest grounds, to represent their client’s

1. See Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1315 (Fed. Cir.
2006).
2. See Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1349, 1350,
1352-53 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting).
3. See, e.g., Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (citing Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Boehringer Ingelheim GMBH, 237 F.3d 1359, 1366
(Fed. Cir. 2001)).
4. See Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 504 F.3d 1223, 1230 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(“[I]nequitable conduct with respect to one or more patents in a family can infect related
applications, . . . .”) (citing Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int’l Ltd., 910 F.2d 804
(Fed. Cir. 1990);
When a court has finally determined that inequitable conduct occurred in relation
to one or more claims during prosecution of the patent application, the entire
patent is rendered unenforceable. We, in banc, reaffirm that rule as set forth in
J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 822 (1985).
Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1067 (1989) (parallel citations omitted); See also Digital Control, 437 F.3d at
1313.
5. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, A PATENT SYSTEM
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 123 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL], available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/10976.html.
6. See, e.g., Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1289 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (en banc); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
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interests adequately, perhaps. They get anywhere with the
accusation in but a small percentage of the cases, but such charges
are not inconsequential on that account. They destroy the respect
for one another’s integrity, for being fellow members of an
honorable profession, that used to make the bar a valuable help to
the courts in making a sound disposition of their cases, and to
7
sustain the good name of the bar itself.

In 2008, the Federal Circuit remarked that “[t]he need to strictly
enforce the burden of proof and elevated standard of proof in the
inequitable conduct context is paramount because the penalty for
inequitable conduct is so severe, the loss of the entire patent even
where every claim clearly meets every requirement of patentability.” 8
The Court observed that “[t]his penalty was originally applied only in
cases of ‘fraud on the Patent Office.’”9 However, “[s]ubsequent case
law has broadened the doctrine to encompass misconduct less
egregious than fraud but the severity of the penalty has not changed,
and thus courts must be vigilant in not permitting the defense to be
applied too lightly.”10
The second element of inequitable conduct, intent to deceive,
also raises concerns.11 Being a subjective inquiry, it is generally
difficult to know the actual intent of the relevant individual and cases
most often rely on circumstantial evidence to prove intent.12 Other
concerns about application of the inequitable conduct doctrine
include: increasing the costs of litigation, prejudicing the patentee,13
7.

Burlington, 849 F.2d at 1422. The Federal Circuit further observed that a
patent litigant should be made to feel, therefore, that an unsupported charge of
“inequitable conduct in the Patent Office” is a negative contribution to the
rightful administration of justice. The charge was formerly known as “fraud on
the Patent Office,” a more pejorative term, but the change of name does not make
the thing itself smell any sweeter.
Id.; see also Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1289; Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 876 & n.15 (writing that the
court desired to avoid a ruling that would “encourage the present proliferation of inequitable
conduct charges” and quoting Burlington for the proposition that “the habit of charging
inequitable conduct in almost every major patent case has become an absolute plague.”).
8. Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir.
2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 655 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
9. Id. at 1365-66 (citing Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238,
250-51 (1944); Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816
(1945)).
10. Id. (citation omitted).
11. See generally id.
12. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 122.
13. See Target Tech. Co., LLC v. Williams Advanced Materials, Inc. No. 04-CV-1083,
2007 WL 6201689, at *42-43 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2007). It is at the trial court’s discretion
whether to bifurcate or try the issues of infringement, validity, and inequitable conduct
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and the Federal Circuit’s inconsistent and unpredictable articulation
and application.14
Ultimately, the burdens imposed by the availability of an
unenforceability defense during litigation due to inequitable conduct
outweigh the benefits. Moreover, there are more efficient and less
prejudicial ways to address inequitable conduct. For example, when
the alleged misconduct is the withholding of known art, asserted
claims will generally be held invalid in light of that art—along with a
finding of inequitable conduct—rendering the doctrine of inequitable
conduct superfluous.15 Moreover, the PTO has, and could at its
discretion: exercise the authority to administer disciplinary sanctions
for misconduct before the Office without need for litigation to arise
where the unenforceability defense due to inequitable conduct is
raised by a party.16
Concerns about the application of the inequitable conduct
doctrine during patent litigation have led to proposed legislative
changes to the Patent Act.17 Naturally, some of the revisions are better
than others.
As discussed below the inequitable conduct doctrine could be
eliminated from litigation without adverse effects on candor before
the PTO,18 the conduct the doctrine was created to encourage,19 by not
awarding the 35 U.S.C. Section 282 presumption of validity to patents
issued where material information was not before the Examiner
during prosecution of the subject patent.

separately or together. If tried separately, inefficiency and additional expense from overlap of
facts and evidence will necessarily occur. If tried together, however, there is a risk that the jury’s
focus may shift from relevant factual issues to the alleged wrongdoings of the patentee and/or
his representatives and prejudice to the jury’s findings on other issues may occur.
14. See generally Astrazeneca Pharm. LP v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 583 F.3d 766, 769
(Fed. Cir. 2009).
15. Katherine Nolan-Stevaux, Note, Inequitable Conduct Claims in the 21st Century:
Combating the Plague, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 163 (2005) (“[I]n 89% of cases, courts
found patents both unenforceable and invalid.”).
16. See 37 C.F.R. § 10.20 (2010).
17. See generally Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005); Patent
Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. (2006); Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th
Cong. (2007); Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 3600, 110th Cong. (2008); Patent Reform Act of
2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. (2009).
18. The PTO could address issues of insufficient candor by disciplinary proceedings.
19. See Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (Rader, J., dissenting).
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A. Overarching Approaches to Application of the Inequitable
Conduct Doctrine: Notice versus Discretion
One perceived problem with the application of the common law
doctrine of inequitable conduct is a lack of notice and predictability
regarding the conduct proscribed due to a lack of a clear articulation
of materiality and intent.
Inequitable conduct, like most rules of law, faces at least two
competing policy goals in this regard. On the one hand, it is desirable
to give notice of what is required to comply with the law.20 This
provides notice and leads to predictability in the application of the
law.21 On the other hand, it is desirable to allow for flexibility so that
the law can be specifically tailored to the circumstances presented
rather than requiring a blanket application based on rigid readings.22
Unfortunately, these broad policy goals are inconsistent, and the line
is often drawn in favor of one set of goals—at the expense of others.23
Indeed, predictability and notice on one hand, and flexibility and
discretion on the other, are antithetical to one another.24
In areas of patent law other than inequitable conduct, such as
claim construction, the Federal Circuit generally draws the line more
toward the side of notice and predictability—at the expense of
flexibility and discretion.25 Indeed, commentators have described the
Federal Circuit as being “preoccupied with predictability and the
notice function of patents.”26

20. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 639-40 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Observing
in a different context that
[i]n the past we have attempted to justify our embarrassing Establishment Clause
jurisprudence on the ground that it “sacrifices clarity and predictability for
flexibility.” One commentator has aptly characterized this as “a euphemism . . .
for . . . the absence of any principled rationale.” I think it time that we sacrifice
some “flexibility” for “clarity and predictability.”
Id. (internal citations omitted).
21. See id.
22. See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946).
23. See United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 818 (3d Cir. 1981).
24. See id.
25. See Meredith Martin Addy, Is the Federal Circuit Ready to Accept Plenary Authority
for Patent Appeals?, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 583, 587 (2005) (quoting Donald R.
Dunner, Jefferson Medalist – 2004 Address, IP MALL (June 4, 2004),
http://ipmall.info/hosted_resources/jefferson_medalists_2004_address.asp).
26. Id. Compare Wright Co. v. Paulhan, 177 F. 261, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1910) (holding that—
in light of the fact that the patent was a pioneering patent—and thus entitled to broad
protection—a pilot of an aircraft that manually adjusted the controls of an aircraft was
equivalent to a rope specified in the claim to automatically adjust the controls). Judge Learned
Hand was more concerned with the flexibility and discretionary side of patent law. By contrast,
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It is of course desirable to provide predictability and notice while
maintaining discretion and flexibility. The proposed 2007 version of
patent reform legislation seems to accomplish that goal.27 The 2007
version of patent reform would have accomplished this inconsistent
objective by codifying and standardizing the definition of
“materiality” and “intent to deceive,” thereby promoting predictability
regarding the requirements for compliance with the inequitable
conduct doctrine.28 The discretionary component in the 2007 version
of patent reform would have come from the ability of a court to
fashion a remedy to the particular facts after a finding of inequitable
conduct, rather than being bound to find all claims invalid.29 The 2007
version, as well as other versions of patent reform, is discussed below.
Before discussing patent reform, the concerns with the common law
doctrine of inequitable conduct should be addressed in more detail in
order to determine the desired changes through legislative or judicial
reform.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Therasense—the Current—but Uncertain and Unstable State
of the Law
On May 25, 2011, the Federal Circuit en banc, in deciding
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., attempted to rein in the
consequences of inequitable conduct in patent litigation. The majority
opinion, joined by six judges and authored by Judge Rader,
“[r]ecogniz[ed] the problems created by expansion and overuse of the
inequitable conduct doctrine,” as the reason for granting the en banc
petition.30 The majority opinion outlined the history of the inequitable
conduct doctrine and observed that the doctrine was initially
concerned “with particularly egregious misconduct, including perjury,
the manufacture of false evidence, and the suppression of evidence.”31
The majority opinion disapproved of inequitable conduct’s role

the Federal Circuit would most likely not consider anything more than a steel cable as being
equivalent to a rope in such a patent.
27. See S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 298 (2007).
28. See id.
29. See, e.g., Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 n.15
(Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1067 (1989).
30. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(en banc).
31. Id. at 1287.
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as “a significant litigation strategy. A charge of inequitable conduct
conveniently expands discovery into corporate practices before patent
filing and disqualifies the prosecuting attorney from the patentee’s
litigation team.”32 Indeed, “[l]eft unfettered, the inequitable conduct
doctrine has plagued not only the courts but also the entire patent
system.”33
The majority thus disapproved of the “sliding scale” approach,
where a weak showing of intent may be found sufficient based on a
strong showing of materiality and vice versa.34 “[A] court must weigh
the evidence of intent to deceive independent of its analysis of
materiality.”35 The majority opinion observed that it had in the past
attempted to reduce the proliferation of inequitable conduct charges
by “raising the intent standard” and making clear that “gross
negligence alone was not enough to justify an inference of intent to
deceive.”36 The majority stated that the intent to deceive prong of
inequitable conduct requires showing by clear and convincing
evidence that “the applicant knew of the reference, knew that it was
material, and made a deliberate decision to withhold it” and when
only circumstantial evidence of intent to deceive was discovered, the
conclusion of intent to deceive must be “the most reasonable
inference.”37
Because the majority felt that raising the intent standard alone
was not effective in reducing the number of inequitable conduct
allegations, the majority opinion adjusted the materiality standard to
require but-for materiality.38 However, the majority opinion left open
the door for allegations of inequitable conduct where an act was not
material under a but-for test, but where misconduct was
“egregious.”39 Thus, while purporting to eliminate the “sliding scale”
the majority opinion seems to retain a sliding scale by tying
“egregious misconduct” to the required showing of materiality.40

32. Id. at 1288 (citing NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 122).
33. Id. at 1289.
34. Id. at 1290.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1291 (citing Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867,
876 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1067 (1989)).
37. Id. at 1290.
38. Id. at 1291. In adopting that standard of materiality, the majority opinion specifically
held that the PTO articulation of the broader definition of materiality in PTO Rule 56 is not
controlling for purposes of inequitable conduct allegations in litigation. Id. at 1293-94.
39. Id. at 1292-93.
40. Id.
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By including the “egregious conduct” exception, the majority
opinion also significantly weakens any benefit that might have been
gained from the opinion. Just as the Federal Circuit’s prior attempt to
reduce the role of inequitable conduct in litigation by clarifying the
required intent threshold to exclude gross negligence largely failed,
the majority’s attempt to curb the role of such inequitable conduct
allegations in litigation by clarifying the materiality standard will
likely fail. Attorneys will continue to assert inequitable conduct in
nearly every litigation based on “egregious misconduct” or by
claiming that the information “but-for” caused at least one claim to
issue.41 Thus, the majority’s attempt to retain flexibility in the
application of the inequitable conduct doctrine will result in continued
problems with the application of such doctrine during litigation.
Judge O’Malley concurred-in-part and dissented-in-part in
Therasense.42 Judge O’Malley favored a flexible approach with an
undefined standard of materiality, apparently at the expense of notice
and certainty during litigation.43 A four-judge dissent in Therasense
advocated retaining the current state of inequitable conduct and use of
the PTO’s current standard of materiality, set forth in Rule 56.44
While the effects of Therasense are yet to be seen, it is not
likely to significantly change the role of inequitable conduct during
patent litigation. The charge of inequitable conduct will continue to
appear in most major patent litigations. Moreover, the United States
Supreme Court might hear the case during its new term, and the
Defendant in Therasense intends to seek a stay of the Federal
Circuit’s ruling in the interim.45

41. The difference of course between this standard of materiality and a finding of
invalidity based on the subject information is “but-for materiality” sufficient to find a single
claim invalid under the inequitable conduct doctrine would render every claim of the patent and
possible all claims of related patents unenforceable.
42. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1296 (O’Malley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
43. Id. at 1298.
44. Id. at 1303.
45. Mike Sobolev, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co.: A Radical Change in
the Legal Standard of Inequitable Conduct, BERKELEY TECH. L.J. BOLT (June 22, 2011),
http://btlj.org/?p=1290.
Allegedly, Becton-Dickinson filed a motion to stay the issuance of the mandate
of the case pending its petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. Due to
the drastic changes affected by Therasense and the Supreme Court’s recent
penchant for reviewing Federal Circuit decisions, it would not be surprising if
these new standards are rejected or modified within the next few years.
Id.
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B. Concerns with the Application of the Common Law
Inequitable Conduct Doctrine—Pre-Therasense Case Law
Because of the uncertain status of Therasense, it is helpful to
examine issues with the inequitable conduct doctrine that lead the
Federal Circuit to attempt to change the state of the inequitable
conduct law in Therasense.
1. The “Materiality” Standard
a.

The Materiality Standard Has Been Articulated in
Varying Manners in an Apparent Attempt to
Retain Discretion, at the Expense of Notice and
Predictability.

As discussed above, in an apparent attempt to retain discretion in
the application of the inequitable conduct doctrine, the Federal Circuit
struggled with a single materiality standard for purposes of
litigation.46 The PTO defines the term “material” in Rule 56.47 Before
Therasense, courts would generally cite to Rule 56 when considering
the materiality prong of an inequitable conduct charge during
litigation, but the Federal Circuit, even before Therasense, indicated
that it is not bound by the PTO’s articulation of materiality, which
served as a useful “starting point” in a materiality determination.48
However, before Therasense, the Federal Circuit failed to adopt any
other useful definition of materiality.49 Indeed, the Federal Circuit
recognized that at least four different standards of materiality have
been used by the court in determining inequitable conduct.50 Adding
to the mix, in 1992, the PTO adopted a different definition of
materiality in Rule 56, which has also been referenced by, but not

46. See Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
47. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (2010).
48. J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“The PTO
standard is the appropriate starting point because it is the broadest and because it most closely
aligns with how one ought to conduct business with the PTO.”).
49. Id.
It has been indicated that the threshold can be established by any of four tests: (1)
objective “but for”; (2) subjective “but for”; (3) “but it may have been”; and (4)
PTO Rule 1.56(a), i.e., whether there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
examiner would have considered the omitted reference or false information
important in deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a patent.
Id.
50. Id.
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clearly adopted by the Federal Circuit during litigation.51 Therefore,
there are at least five definitions of materiality that have been
referenced by the Federal Circuit.52
The pre-1992 version of Rule 56 provided that information is
material “where there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
examiner would consider it important in deciding whether to allow
the application to issue as a patent” (the “reasonable examiner
standard”).53 The “prima facie case standard” is codified in the
current version of Rule 56, which provides that:
information is material to patentability when it is not cumulative to
information already of record or being made of record in the
application, and (1) it establishes, by itself or in combination with
other information, a prima facie case of unpatentability of a claim;
or (2) it refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position the applicant
takes in: (i) opposing an argument of unpatentability relied on by
54
the Office, or (ii) asserting an argument of patentability.

Over time, before Therasense, the Federal Circuit moved away
from the more restrictive “but for tests” for materiality, while
struggling to clearly establish whether the appropriate standard in
litigation was the old version or the new version of Rule 56.55 In
2003, The Federal Circuit analyzed which of the two Rule 56
materiality standards should apply, but ultimately wrote that
“[b]ecause . . . the outcome of this appeal would be the same under
either materiality standard, we leave for another day a final
disposition of this issue.”56

51. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1992).
52. See J.P. Stevens, 747 F.2d at 1559; Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharm. Inc., 438
F.3d 1123, 1134-35 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
53. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1991). The “reasonable examiner” standard is generally considered
the broadest interpretation of materiality. It is not clear, however, why it is broader than the
prima facie case standard because it is not clear why a reasonable examiner would want to know
about something that does not constitute a prima facie case of unpatentability. Regardless, the
Federal Circuit has stated that the older “reasonable examiner” standard is “arguably” broader
than the new “prima facie case of unpatentability” standard. Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles
Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1314-16 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The “but for” tests were narrower,
requiring a showing that the patent would not have issued but for the information being omitted.
Id. at 1316.
54. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2010). It remains to be seen whether compliance with Rule 56 will
be a consideration in whether an applicant acted with “egregious misconduct” such that a “butfor” finding of materiality need not be shown, under the Therasense test. Logically, it is difficult
to see how “egregious misconduct” could occur if an applicant complied with Rule 56.
55. See Astrazeneca Pharm. LP v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 583 F.3d 766, 773 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
56. Dayco Products, Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1364 (Fed. Cir.
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Thereafter, on February 1, 2006, the Federal Circuit in Purdue
Pharma, L.P. v. Endo Pharms., Inc.57 applied the new Rule 56 prima
facie case of patentability test, writing, that “[i]n evaluating
materiality, this court has consistently referred to the standard set
forth in PTO Rule 56.”58 The court continued, “[b]ecause all of the
patent applications at issue in this case were pending on or filed after
March 16, 1992,59 we look to the current version of Rule 56, rather
than the pre-1992 version of the rule.”60
Just one week later, however, the Federal Circuit applied the old
reasonable examiner test, writing that “[f]or many years, we have held
that ‘materiality for purposes of an inequitable conduct determination
require[s] a showing that “a reasonable examiner would have
considered such prior art important in deciding whether to allow the
parent application.”’”61 The court ultimately concluded that the
“reasonable examiner” standard and case law interpreting that
standard were not supplanted by the PTO’s adoption of a new Rule
56, and thus materiality during litigation was determined according to
the older and “arguably broader” “reasonable examiner” standard.62
Thus, according to pre-Therasense Federal Circuit precedent, even if
a prosecuting attorney complied with the current version of Rule 56 at
trial she could be found to have committed inequitable conduct under
the older, arguably broader “reasonable examiner standard.”63
Since then the Federal Circuit has primarily used the old
“reasonable examiner standard” in determining materiality during
2003).
57. Purdue, 438 F.3d 1123.
58. Id. at 1129.
59. March 16, 1992, is the date that the new version of Rule 56 took effect. 57 Fed. Reg.
2021, 2021-34 (Jan. 17, 1992) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.56).
60. Purdue, 438 F.3d at 1129.
61. Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(quoting Dayco, 329 F.3d at 1363).
62. Id. at 1316. This was despite the fact that one week prior, in Purdue (cited by the
Digital Control court), the court had said that the new version of Rule 56 applied to materiality
determinations for patents filed after 1992, as the patents were in Digital Control. Id.
63. The PTO generally gives claims their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent
with the specification when determining patentability. See, e.g., In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech
Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Therefore, it is possible that even if the same
standard of materiality is used both during prosecution and litigation, a reference could be
material during prosecution of an application but not during litigation, if the district court
construes the claims more narrowly than did the examiner. In theory, however, the opposite
should not be true. Unless the examiner errs in construing the claim terms during prosecution—
giving them too narrow of an interpretation—there should not be a time when a reference is
material during litigation, but it was not during prosecution—provided the same standard of
materiality is applied in both venues.
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litigation.64 However, the Federal Circuit occasionally referred to the
new version of Rule 56.65 In 2009, the Federal Circuit again
acknowledged that a uniform standard for materiality had yet to be
established, observing that twenty-four years earlier66 it had identified
four tests for materiality but still failed to conclusively identify a
particular standard.67 The court did write, however, that “[w]hile a
uniform standard has not been rigorously applied in the courts, the
fourth test of whether a reasonable examiner would have considered
the information important in deciding whether to grant the patent,
even when the omitted information does not negate patentability, is
most often employed.”68
Ultimately, while Therasense provides some guidance that
generally “but for” materiality must be shown, wherein at least one
claim of the patent at issue must be shown invalid by the undisclosed
information, the majority’s opinion remains unclear as to the scope of
its “egregious misconduct” exception to “but for” materiality and
whether one of the other previously used standards of materiality
might be employed to make a determination of “egregious
misconduct.”
b.

Materiality Determinations Necessarily Require
Attorney or Agent Judgment

Regardless of what standard for “materiality” is applied during
litigation, patent prosecuting attorneys and agents must make
judgments regarding whether a reference is “material” on limited
budgets. The best practice for prosecuting attorneys appears to be a
policy of being overly inclusive and submitting all references that are
64. See, e.g., Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365
(Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 655 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
65. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Bayer Bioscience N.V., 514 F.3d 1229, 1236-37 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (discussing both the old “reasonable examiner” standard and the new “prima facie” case
version of Rule 56); Impax Labs., Inc. v. Aventis Pharms. Inc., 468 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2006).
We see no error in the ruling of the district court that the [data was] not material
under either Rule 56 standard. There is no evidence that the withheld
comparative test data establishes by itself or in combination with other
information a prima facie case of unpatentability of a claim.
Id. at 1377.
66. See Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 166 n.19 (Fed.
Cir. 1985).
67. Astrazeneca Pharm. LP v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 583 F.3d 766, 773 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
68. Id. (citing Upjohn Co. v. MOVA Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d 1306, 1312 (Fed. Cir.
2000)).
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remotely related to the invention that the prosecuting attorney is
aware of, regardless of whether the prosecuting attorney subjectively
believes that the references are “material” or “cumulative” in order to
avoid a later charge of inequitable conduct because of a different
subjective understanding of the reference.
This incentive to over-cite references is problematic. This
practice increases the burden on the PTO by causing the examiner to
review references of marginal relevance.69 More troubling from the
perspective of the patentee and its representatives—there is case law
holding that intent to deceive and inequitable conduct may be based
on a finding that the prosecuting attorney cited too much art and
intended to hide a reference by “burying” it along with other
references cited to the PTO.70
Consequently, a prosecuting attorney or agent must necessarily
make certain subjective judgments regarding whether to submit prior
art.71 If he makes an error in judgment or uses the wrong standard of
materiality72 and submits too little or too much art, his client could
69. Brief of Amicus Curiae Boston Patent Law Association Neutral as to Parties at 11,
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (Nos.
04-CV-2123, 04-CV-3327, 04-CV-3732, 05-CV-3117). See generally Benjamin K. Sovacool,
Placing a Glove on the Invisible Hand: How Intellectual Property Rights May Impede
Innovation in Energy Research and Development (R&D), 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 381, 407
(2008).
70. See, e.g., Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn Co., Inc., 837 F.
Supp. 1444, 1477 (N.D. Ind. 1992), aff’d, 11 F.3d 1072 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S.
1128 (1994).
The court further holds that it is likewise a violation of the duty of candor and
fair dealing with the Patent Office for an applicant or its attorney to disclose a
pertinent prior art patent reference to the examiner in such a way as to “bury” it
or its disclosures in a series of disclosures of less relevant prior art references, so
that the examiner would be likely to ignore the entire list and permit the
application to issue.
Id.
71. See Purdue Pharma Prods. L.P. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 642 F. Supp. 2d 329, 377 n.57 (D.
Del. 2009).
There is an undeniable tension between, on the one hand, cases that say that “[a]n
applicant can not [sic] be guilty of inequitable conduct if the reference was cited
to the examiner,” Fiskars, Inc. v. Hunt Mfg. Co., 221 F.3d 1318, 1327 (Fed. Cir.
2000), and those that say, on the other, that “‘burying’ a particularly material
reference in a prior art statement containing a multiplicity of other references can
be probative of bad faith,” Molins [PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1184
(Fed. Cir. 1995)].
Id.
72. As long as the prosecuting attorney complies with the new “prima facie” case
standard of materiality under new Rule 56 during prosecution, even if the older, and “arguably
broader” old version of Rule 56, the “reasonable examiner” standard, is employed during
litigation, the standards are probably sufficiently similar that an attorney may not be found to
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face a charge of unenforceability due to inequitable conduct during
litigation. In light of limited budgets, the subjective nature of the
analysis, whether information is cumulative, and the not-yet clearly
defined term “materiality” discussed above, this doctrine can place
prosecuting attorneys in a difficult position.73
c.

Materiality Does Not Require that a Withheld
Reference Render any of the Claims of the
Asserted Patent Invalid in Litigation

Until Therasense, “but-for”74 causation for materiality was not
required—a patent could be rendered unenforceable for inequitable
conduct even though the withheld information would not render any
of the claims of the patent invalid.75 Although disciplinary action by
the PTO might be appropriate under those circumstances, there does
not appear to be a compelling reason why a patent should be rendered
unenforceable if the withheld information would not render any of the
claims invalid.76 Under those circumstances, neither the public nor the
accused infringer was prejudiced77 by the information not78 being

have withheld material information (or submitted too much information in an attempt to “bury”
the reference) based on that distinction alone. In light of the seriousness of the charge, both in
the sense of the monetary value of some patents and the reputational value of such a charge to
the subject prosecuting attorney, fundamental fairness dictates that notice should be clearly
provided regarding the actual standards to be employed in determining materiality during
litigation.
73. In some areas of technology understanding each reference sufficiently to make such
judgment about materiality and cumulativeness can be very time consuming.
74. Again, even under the Therasense majority opinion, “but for” materiality is not
required for undefined “egregious misconduct.” Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.,
649 F.3d 1276, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc). See supra text accompanying notes 39, 40.
75. See, e.g., Frazier v. Roessel Cine Photo Tech, Inc., 417 F.3d 1230, 1240 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (Bryson, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part) (“The doctrine of inequitable
conduct is not so narrow that it applies only when patent claims are invalid. Li Second Family
Ltd. P’ship v. Toshiba Corp., 231 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (‘Information concealed
from the PTO may be material even though it would not invalidate the patent.’)”); Merck & Co.,
Inc. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 873 F.2d 1418, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“That the claimed
invention may have been superior . . . to both the cited and withheld prior art may be a basis for
patentability; it cannot serve automatically to render the withheld prior art either cumulative or
immaterial.”); A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 798 F.2d 1392, 1396 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (noting
that whether the claims may be patentable over the withheld prior art is not the test for
materiality).
76. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 10.23 (2010).
77. If “but for” causation was required before withheld information was considered
material the patent would generally be held invalid in litigation based on that withheld
information (depending upon relative claim interpretation during prosecution and litigation).
78. The PTO could still issue sanctions under those circumstances for a violation of its
rules. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 11.18 (2010).
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before the examiner. Such a result amounts to a windfall for the
accused infringer and seems to be an overly harsh result for the
patentee.
2. The Intent Element of Inequitable Conduct is
Inconsistently Applied, Difficult to Administer, and
Expensive to Litigate
a.

Intent Has Been Applied in Varying Manners in
the Inequitable Conduct Analysis

The common and ordinary meaning of “intent” is: “Design,
resolve, or determination with which [a] person acts[; a] state of mind
in which a person seeks to accomplish a given result through a course
of action.”79 Intent therefore refers to a subjectively desired result.
With respect to the inequitable conduct doctrine, “the intent to
deceive may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances rather
than by direct evidence.”80 “[T]he intent necessary to establish
inequitable conduct is based on a sliding scale related to materiality of
the omission.”81 “[T]he more material the omission or the
misrepresentation, the lower the level of intent required to establish
inequitable conduct, and vice versa.”82
Early on, the Federal Circuit held that “intent” is a subjective
term that can be demonstrated by an objective showing of “gross
negligence.”83 “Aside from direct evidence of wrongful intent—i.e.,
deliberate scheming—intent may be proven by a showing of acts the
natural consequences of which are presumably intended by the
actor.”84 The court thus held that “[t]he lower threshold for finding
intent is therefore satisfied by evidence of gross negligence.”85 The
Federal Circuit, by the above-quoted language in Hycor Corp. v.
79. Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1180 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (alteration in
original) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 810 (6th ed. 1990).
80. Abbott Labs. v. Torpharm, Inc., 300 F.3d 1367, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing
Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
81. Id.
82. Monon Corp. v. Stoughton Trailers, Inc., 239 F.3d 1253, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(quoting Critikon, 120 F.3d at 1256); Akzo N.V. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 808 F.2d 1471,
1481-82 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 909 (1987). The Therasense majority opinion
will likely prove unsuccessful in eliminating the sliding scale, based on its “egregious
misconduct” exception.
83. Hycor Corp. v. Schlueter Co., 740 F.2d 1529, 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
84. Id. (citing Kansas Jack, Inc. v. Kuhn, 719 F.2d 1144, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Am.
Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
85. Id.

13 JOHNSON (DO NOT DELETE)

212

3/23/2012 11:26 AM

SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 28

Schlueter Co., apparently combined objective and subjective
standards. The court asserted that the actor “presumably intended”
consequences of his actions when in fact, negligence or gross
negligence means that the actor did not necessarily presume or was
not even necessarily aware of the consequences of his actions.86
Indeed, intent is irrelevant to a finding of negligence, which is based
on an objective reasonable person standard rather than any
subjectively desired result of the actor.87
Over time, Federal Circuit cases generally came to reject its
earlier decisions indicating that gross negligence may be sufficient to
infer an intent to deceive. In Astrazeneca Pharm. LP v. Teva Pharm.
USA, Inc., the court stated:
[e]vidence of mistake or negligence, even gross negligence, is not
sufficient to support inequitable conduct in patent prosecution. To
establish the requisite deceptive intent, “the involved conduct,
viewed in light of all the evidence, including evidence indicative of
good faith, must indicate sufficient culpability to require a finding
88
of intent to deceive.”

The Federal Circuit’s more stringent articulation of the intent
element of inequitable conduct may be seen as a recognition that the
doctrine of inequitable conduct has grown89 beyond its original
purpose.90 For example, in a strongly worded dissent, Judge Rader
86. See Sedgmer v. McElroy Coal Co., 640 S.E.2d 129, 133 (W. Va. 2006) (noting that
negligence is irrelevant to a discussion of deliberate intent).
87. See id. at 134.
88. Astrazeneca Pharm. LP v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 583 F.3d 766, 776 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (quoting Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (internal citation omitted).
89. Judge Rader observed that the Federal Circuit still appears to give too little weight to
the intent element but instead tends to merge it with the materiality element. Aventis Pharma
S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting)
(“More recently, however, the judicial process has too often emphasized materiality almost to
the exclusion of any analysis of the lofty intent requirement for inequitable conduct. Merging
intent and materiality at levels far below the Kingsdown rule has revived the inequitable conduct
tactic.”).
90. The Federal Circuit’s cases seem to show an evolution requiring a higher showing of
actual intent to deceive. In initially moving away from the gross negligence standard the court
articulated that
[w]e adopt the view that a finding that particular conduct amounts to “gross
negligence” does not of itself justify an inference of intent to deceive; the
involved conduct, viewed in light of all the evidence, including evidence
indicative of good faith, must indicate sufficient culpability to require a finding
of intent to deceive.
Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1067 (1989) (emphasis added). That articulation seems to indicate that gross
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observed that “[a]lthough designed to facilitate USPTO examination,
inequitable conduct has taken on a new life as a litigation tactic.”91
Indeed, in Therasense, the majority opinion again appeared to
tighten the intent requirement, by stating that gross negligence was
not enough to satisfy the intent element and that intent could only be
shown by clear and convincing evidence that “the applicant knew of
the reference, knew it was material, and made a deliberate decision to
withhold it.”92 However, the Therasense court left open the possibility
that intent could be proven by circumstantial evidence when intent to
deceive was “the single most reasonable inference.”93
b.

Intent Usually Must Be Proven by Circumstantial
Evidence

Intent is generally inferred from the facts and circumstances
surrounding the applicant’s overall conduct; taking into account
evidence of good and bad faith.94 Because there generally is not direct
evidence of bad faith, most cases rely on circumstantial95 evidence.96

negligence may be relevant to the inquiry, supports a showing of intent, but insufficient in itself
to show intent. However, the most recent cases have indicated that gross negligence does not
“support a ruling of inequitable conduct,” which appears to be a more stringent standard for a
showing of intent. Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
91. Aventis, 525 F.3d at 1349 (Rader, J., dissenting). Judge Rader also noted that
[t]his phenomenon is not new or unprecedented. At an earlier time, the Federal
Circuit also observed that inequitable conduct as a litigation strategy had become
a “plague.” Burlington Indus. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir.
1988). In response, this court took a case to reduce abuse of inequitable conduct.
Kingsdown Med. Consultant, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (en banc). In light of the rejuvenation of the inequitable conduct tactic, this
court ought to revisit occasionally its Kingsdown opinion.
Id. at 1350 (Rader, J., dissenting).
92. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(en banc).
93. Id.
94. See Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Servs., Ltd., 394 F.3d 1348,
1354 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
95. See, e.g., Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1366
(Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 655 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“We have also held
that because direct evidence of deceptive intent is rarely available, such intent can be inferred
from indirect and circumstantial evidence.”); Kansas Jack, Inc. v. Kuhn, 719 F.2d 1144, 1151
(Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that intent need not be proven by direct evidence; it is most often
proven “by a showing of acts the natural consequences of which are presumably intended by the
actor.”); Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Labs., Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1189-90 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (observing that generally, intent must be inferred from the facts and circumstances
surrounding the applicant’s conduct).
96. This is not to suggest that circumstantial evidence categorically is inherently less
reliable than direct evidence. Indeed, the Federal Rules specifically reject that categorical
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c. The Sliding Scale
Although the Federal Circuit has emphasized that minimum
thresholds of both materiality and intent must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence, after making such a showing, the district court
“look[s] to the equities by weighing the facts underlying those
showings.”97 “The more material the omission or the
misrepresentation, the lower [the] level of intent [is] required to
establish inequitable conduct, and vice versa.”98 The Federal Circuit
explained at one point that
At this second stage, however, the question is no longer whether
materiality and/or intent to deceive were proven with evidence that
is sufficiently clear and convincing. While the facts of materiality
and intent to deceive must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence, the district court must balance the substance of those
now-proven facts and all the equities of the case to determine
whether the severe penalty of unenforceability should be
99
imposed.

Many cases have confirmed that regardless of the degree of
materiality, intent cannot be inferred.100 As recently as 2006 the
Federal Circuit wrote that when materiality is low “there is less basis
for inferring intent from materiality alone,” implying that there may
be circumstances where intent could be inferred from materiality
alone.101
It is not readily apparent why a high degree of materiality should
lessen the separate element of intent.102 As the courts have

approach. See Richard K. Greenstein, Determining Facts: The Myth of Direct Evidence, 45
HOUS. L. REV. 1801, 1803 (2009) (but noting that many states imply or directly state to juries
that circumstantial evidence is less reliable than direct evidence). Any time a fact finder must
ascertain what a person was actually thinking there is likely to be a high degree of error (absent
the extraordinarily rare occasion where there might be a tangible record of actual intent in the
form of a document or third-party testimony of actual expressed intent).
97. Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1365.
98. Id. at 1367 (quoting Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120
F.3d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). Again, despite language that disapproves of the “sliding
scale” in the majority opinion, the effect of Therasense on this analysis is unclear—at least
where “egregious misconduct” is alleged.
99. Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1367.
100. See, e.g., Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 872
(Fed. Cir. 1988); Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1366.
101. Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharm. Inc., 438 F.3d 1123, 1134-35 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
The continued validity of this statement is questionable in light of Therasense.
102. See, e.g., Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1366.
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recognized, these two elements are entirely separate inquiries.103
In addition to this analytical problem, it is also unclear exactly
how this balancing is to proceed. Initially, it is unclear whether the
lower level of intent is in reference to the amount104 of intent or the
amount of proof of intent that is required for a finding of inequitable
conduct. The former is troublesome because “intent” does not seem to
have varying degrees—it is either present or it is not.105 In contrast to
terms that may have varying degrees or amounts an individual cannot
have varying degrees or amounts of intent, just as an individual
cannot have varying degrees or amounts of death.106
If the sliding scale of a lesser showing of intent instead refers to
a lesser amount of proof107 being required for a finding of intent to
deceive where there is also a high degree of materiality shown, this
analysis is also troubling. First, because as previously mentioned, the
initial step requires that the finder of fact108 determine that both
materiality and intent have been shown by clear and convincing
evidence before the court balances the two and makes the ultimate
determination of whether inequitable conduct has occurred.109 Thus,
the sliding scale should not even be considered by the court unless
intent has already been proven by clear and convincing evidence,

103. See id.
104. This would seem to be the appropriate reading of some Federal Circuit case law. See
Halliburton Co. v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 925 F.2d 1435, 1439 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“The more
material the omission, the less culpable the intent required, and vice versa.”).
105. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 881 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis omitted) (“intent. (13c) 1.
The state of mind accompanying an act, esp. a forbidden act. • While motive is the inducement
to do some act, intent is the mental resolution or determination to do it.”).
106. Benjamin Franklin is credited with coining the phrase “[i]n this world nothing is
certain but death and taxes.” Benjamin Franklin Quotes, BRAINYQUOTE,
http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/b/benjaminfr151592.html (last visited Dec. 15,
2011). To the extent that the Federal Circuit has rejected the idea of gross negligence serving as
a ground for “intent,” see Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008),
and as long as the term “intent” is used in its pure, subjective state of mind sense—the desire to
bring about a certain result—intent is either present or it is not.
107. In Purdue, the Federal Circuit indicated that a lesser amount or quantum of proof of
intent was required when a high degree of materiality was shown. Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo
Pharm. Inc., 438 F.3d 1123, 1135 (Fed. Cir. 2006). See also PerSeptive Biosystems, Inc. v.
Pharmacia Biotech, Inc., 225 F.3d 1315, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citation omitted) (in cases where
the omission or misrepresentation is highly material, “less evidence of intent will be required in
order to find that inequitable conduct has occurred.”).
108. Eisai Co. Ltd. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Ltd., 533 F.3d 1353, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(“Materiality . . . and intent are both questions of fact, and require proof by clear and convincing
evidence.”).
109. See Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 655 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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meaning that regardless of the degree of materiality, intent cannot
drop below the clear and convincing quantum of proof.110 Moreover,
and maybe more importantly, it simply does not make sense to require
less proof of intent where there is higher showing of materiality,
where the two prongs are entirely separate111 and unrelated in some
circumstances.112
In actuality, the sliding scale was most likely a means for the
courts to retain discretion in the application of the inequitable conduct
doctrine. The sliding scale was an attempt to “balance the substance
of” all of the facts and all the equities “to determine whether the
severe penalty of unenforceability should be imposed.”113 However,
as discussed above, the sliding scale does not make sense114—and its

110. See id. at 1367 (“At this second stage, however, the question is no longer whether
materiality and/or intent to deceive were proven with evidence that is sufficiently clear and
convincing.”).
111. This is analogous to saying in cases of a person being charged with driving under the
influence of alcohol, where she was shown to be very drunk, less proof that she was actually
driving need be shown than if she was just a little drunk. In both instances the elements are
separate and there does not seem to be a logical reason to reduce the burden of proof with
respect to a showing on one element in the face of a higher degree or showing on the other
element.
112. For instance, if the applicant asserts that she was unaware of a prior art reference—
the degree of materiality of the reference is not probative of whether she was indeed aware of it
with respect to the intent prong of the inequitable conduct inquiry. The high degree of
materiality does not make it more likely that she was aware of such reference than a low degree
of materiality would. If it is established that the applicant was aware of the reference but the
dispute is whether she intended to withhold or deceive by withholding the reference one might
be able to make an argument that an applicant might be more likely to withhold a highly
material reference than a less material reference and thus intent to deceive could properly be
inferred from the withholding of a more material reference. However, that may not always be
the case. See Thomas C. Fiala & Jon E. Wright, Preparing and Prosecuting a Patent that Holds
up in Litigation, in PATENT LITIGATION 515, 523 (2006). Indeed, an applicant might be more
likely to disclose to the examiner a highly material reference—at least where the reference is
publically available—so that the applicant has an opportunity to address the reference in the
patent application and during prosecution (because the PTO does its own search and may find
the subject reference). See id. This would seem to be a theory behind many applicants choosing
to conduct prior art searches when filing applications. See id. Ultimately, there are simply too
many variables and the materiality and intent prongs are too far removed and distinct from one
another to draw any inference with respect to intent based on the degree of materiality.
113. Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1367.
114. A better way than the sliding scale to retain that discretion and flexibility is set forth
in the 2007 version of patent reform. It requires, for a finding of inequitable conduct, that intent
and materiality be separately proven without respect to any sliding scale. After such a finding,
however, it provides the court discretion in the application of a remedy. This is discussed below,
but in essence it would provide clear notice of requirements to avoid a finding of inequitable
conduct while retaining flexibility with respect to the remedy imposed under all of the facts and
circumstances.
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application has been reduced by Therasense.115
3. The Inequitable Conduct Doctrine Increases the Cost of
Litigation
The cost of litigation has become a real concern.116 In patent
infringement cases, the cost of litigating inequitable conduct during
patent prosecution is particularly high because of the factually
intensive nature of the charge.117 In particular, the subjective intent to
deceive element generally lacks direct evidence and must be proven118
by costly-to-obtain circumstantial evidence.119 Moreover, third-party
discovery is nearly always sought from the prosecuting attorney, often
both in the form of document requests and live deposition
testimony.120 This often leads to difficult questions of privilege121 that
must be decided by the court through discovery motions. The high
cost of obtaining discovery and litigating charges of inequitable
conduct militates against the continuation of the availability of the
inequitable conduct defense—at least in its current form.
4. The Inequitable Conduct Doctrine May Tarnish the
Reputation of Prosecuting Attorneys and the Bar in
General
Allegations of inequitable conduct often involve a charge of
115. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(en banc).
116. See, e.g., id. at 1288; see also THE AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON
DISCOVERY & THE INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., FINAL REPORT
(2009) (discussing inefficiency and burden of litigation and discovery in general and
recommending streamlining procedures to help reduce the cost).
117. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct
Doctrine, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723, 740 (2009).
118. Being an equitable doctrine, the ultimate decision of whether inequitable conduct has
occurred is a question for the court but it is based on underlying factual issues that, in a jury
trial, must be determined by the jury. See, e.g., Eisai Co. Ltd. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Ltd., 533
F.3d 1353, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ & ROBERT J. GOLDMAN,
PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 277 n.67 (6th ed. 2008) (gathering cases which decided, among
other things, that if a jury determines underlying factual issues relating to inequitable conduct or
common factual issues affecting both inequitable conduct and legal issues, the court is bound by
those findings).
119. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5.
120. Cotropia, supra note 117, at 740 (footnotes omitted) (“[T]he deposition of the
prosecuting attorney who handled the application is almost always necessary in the inequitable
conduct inquiry. Such depositions are uniquely costly because they are littered with complex
attorney-client privilege issues that generate their own legal questions which demand additional
attorney and judicial resources to resolve.”).
121. Id.
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misconduct by the prosecuting attorney.122 These allegations are
generally not successful.123 However, they still may tarnish the
reputation of the attorneys implicated by the allegations.124 This
tarnishment also diminishes the reputation of all lawyers.125
In light of these concerns, another federal court has recently
attempted to curb the liberal use of inequitable conduct during
litigation.126 In reality, it is not the fault of the litigation attorneys who
assert the defense but rather a built-in consequence of the doctrine
itself. During litigation, a litigating attorney arguably has an ethical
obligation to assert the defense of inequitable conduct if there is any
good faith basis for doing so.127 Consequently, as long as the law
remains in its current form, an abundance of marginal inequitable
conduct assertions undoubtedly continue to be raised.
Patent prosecuting attorneys and patent agents generally do not
intend to deceive the PTO. In addition, there is often little incentive
for a prosecuting attorney to do so. Most patent attorneys charge a
relatively small amount—between $10,000 and $30,000—to draft and
prosecute a patent application128 and prosecuting attorneys will often
be involved with the prosecution of dozens, if not hundreds of
applications, at any given time. It seems unlikely that most
prosecuting attorneys would risk their reputation and livelihood by
intentionally making misrepresentations to the PTO in order to get a
single application issued.129 Indeed, even without regard to the
doctrine of inequitable conduct, if a prosecuting attorney is found to
have withheld material information he is subject to sanctions by the

122. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
123. Id.
124. See id. (observing that allegations of inequitable conduct tarnish the reputation of
prosecuting attorneys even when the allegations are not proven).
125. Id.
126. Mem. & Order Re: Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J.; Pl.’s Rule 56(f) Mot. at 8, Z-Line
Designs, Inc. v. Planet 3, LLC, No. C 09-01153 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2009), 2009 WL 2710122
(quoting Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1995)) (“The court reminds
counsel for defendant of the Federal Circuit’s admonition concerning the practice of routinely
accusing adversaries of inequitable conduct: ‘[U]unjustified accusations of inequitable conduct
are offensive and unprofessional.’”).
127. “A lawyer has the responsibility of representing his client to the fullest extent
possible, within the bounds of the law.” Commonwealth v. Rubright, 414 A.2d 106, 110 (Pa.
1980) (citing the MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7, EC 7-1).
128. Leah C. Fletcher, Equal Treatment Under Patent Law: A Proposed Exception to the
On-Sale Bar, 13 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 209, 230 (2005).
129. There may be exceptions for complex applications that during the prosecution stage
are expected to be asserted in litigation after issuance, in which case there may be incentives for
prosecuting attorneys to withhold material information from the PTO.
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PTO including suspension of his ability to practice before the PTO.130
The abundance of inequitable conduct charges involving
prosecuting attorneys may be a product of the relatively small
prosecution budget relative to the large budgets that usually
accompany patent litigation. Attorneys’ fees to try a patent case range
from one million dollars for a very simple case, to four to six million
dollars for a case of average complexity, to ten to twelve million
dollars or more for complex cases.131 Therefore, the charges of
inequitable conduct involving a prosecuting attorney may reflect in
part the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, with the advantage of millions of
dollars of litigation resources devoted to second-guessing choices
made on a limited budget, rather than any conscious decision on the
part of the prosecuting attorney or agent to intentionally deceive the
PTO.
C. Statutory Reforms Affecting the Inequitable Conduct
Doctrine
1. The Current Reform—H.R. 1249
On September 16, 2011, President Barack Obama signed into
law H.R. 1249.132 This legislation affects patents in major ways
including implementing a modified “first to file” rather than first to
invent framework.133 The effects of those modifications to 35 U.S.C.
are well beyond the scope of this paper.
However, H.R. 1249 also will have some effect on allegations of
inequitable conduct during litigation. Although the Act does not
mention the words “inequitable conduct” it provides for a new section
to 35 U.S.C., section 257.134 Section 257 provides for a “supplemental
examination proceedings” before the Patent and Trademark Office in
order to reduce the effects of charges of inequitable conduct in patent
litigation.135 The amendment allows the patent owner to request

130. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 11.18 (2010); Jeanne C. Curtis et al., Litigation Issues Relevant
to Patent Prosecution – The Defense of Inequitable Conduct, in FUNDAMENTALS OF PATENT
PROSECUTION 229 (2007).
131. Bryan W. Cooper, Patent Enforcement Through Litigation, in FUNDAMENTALS OF
PATENT PROSECUTION 137, 167 (2005).
132. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-112publ29/pdf/PLAW-112publ29.pdf (to be
codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
133. See id. § 3.
134. Id. § 12.
135. Id.
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consideration of new information for an issued patent.136 If a
“substantial question of patentability” is shown, the patent is put into
reexamination proceedings.137 Information considered during a
supplemental examination proceeding may not be used during
litigation on that patent to hold the subject patent unenforceable for
inequitable conduct.138 However, the supplemental examination
safeguard is only available to a patent owner if the supplemental
proceeding request is completed before allegations of inequitable
conduct are pleaded in a patent infringement case in the district
court.139 Therefore, charges of unenforceability for inequitable
conduct before the PTO will likely remain a large part of patent
litigation for conduct that was not considered during the initial
prosecution of the patent or during a Supplemental Proceeding.
Rather than eliminating inequitable conduct charges during patent
litigation, H.R. 1249 may increase proceedings before the PTO, while
leaving charges of inequitable conduct in play in most major patent
litigations.
2. Prior Versions of Patent Reform, Which Might be
Better Alternatives to the Current Law
Prior to the passage of H.R. 1249, there were various versions of
un-passed Patent Reform Legislation that addressed inequitable
conduct. Some of the proposed reform was spurred by a National
Academy of Science Report in 2004. As discussed below, some of the
past versions of patent reform might have provided better alternatives
to inequitable conduct reform than the current version of the law.
3. The 2003 FTC Report and National Academy of
Science 2004 Report
In 2004, the National Academy of Sciences released a report
(“NAS Report”) that addressed patent reform.140 The NAS Report

136. Id. A third party may initiate the proceeding. Both ex-parte and inter-parte
reexamination can currently be initiated by a third party but both are limited to consideration of
validity of an issued patent in light of prior art in the form of patents and printed publications.
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-307, 311 (2002).
137. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 12.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 123. Prior to that, in 2003 the FTC
issued a report addressing patent reform. Although the FTC report touches on the issue of
inequitable conduct briefly, the report does not focus on that aspect of patent law nor make
recommendations specific thereto. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE
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recommended that all subjective components should be eliminated
from patent litigation—or at least modified and their role in litigation
reduced.141 The NAS Report identified “willful” infringement, “best
mode” and “inequitable conduct” as subjective inquires that were
specific areas of concern.142 The NAS Report observed that subjective
state-of-mind factors increase the cost and decrease the predictability
of patent infringement litigation.143 The NAS Report further noted
that discovery on those subjective inquires is time-consuming,
expensive, and ultimately, “a principal source of soaring litigation
costs.”144 “The committee believes that significantly modifying or
eliminating these rules would increase the predictability of patent
dispute outcomes without substantially affecting the principles that
these aspects of the enforcement system were meant to promote.”145
The NAS Report also observed that since the creation of the
inequitable conduct doctrine by the courts, other procedures had been
adopted by Congress and the PTO to support the integrity of the
patent system.146 Specifically, the NAS Report pointed to “thirdparty- and USPTO-initiated re-examination on withheld prior art,
publication of pending applications, and third-party access to pending
prosecution papers and the ability to submit material information.”147
The NAS Report concluded that:
In view of its cost and limited deterrent value the committee
recommends the elimination of the inequitable conduct doctrine or
changes in its implementation. The latter might include ending the
inference of intent from the materiality of the information that was
148
withheld, de novo review by the Federal Circuit of district court

PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 5, at 11 (2003),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf. (“Another modification discussed
during the Hearings would extend the disclosure duty to an inventor’s co-employees. Some
panelists opposed expanded search duties as adding to patent preparation costs, raising difficult
enforcement problems, fueling frivolous inequitable conduct defenses, or not necessarily
contributing additional useful disclosure.”).
141. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 7.
142. Id. at 7, 118-23.
143. Id. at 7.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 122-23.
147. Id. at 123. The NAS Report also proposes an “open review process” that would
further contribute to the integrity of the system. Id.
148. The Federal Circuit purports to review inequitable conduct under an abuse of
discretion standard. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876
(Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1067 (1989). It is not clear that reviewing findings of
inequitable conduct de novo would reduce the assertion of the defense and such a standard
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findings of inequitable conduct, award of attorney’s fees to a
prevailing patentee, or referral to the USPTO for re-examination
149
and disciplinary action.

It seemed apparent that changes to the implementation of the
inequitable conduct doctrine were needed.
4. The Various Versions of Proposed Legislative Reform
Following the FTC Report and NAS Report, beginning in 2005,
patent reform legislation was proposed and introduced every year,
until finally H.R. 1249 was passed into law in 2011.150 The various
versions of proposed patent reform can generally be lumped into four
categories. The first category, characterized by the 2006 and 2009151
versions, failed to mention inequitable conduct; presumably intending
to leave the doctrine in its current form under the common law.152 The
second category, characterized by the 2007 version of patent reform,
would have codified the common law doctrine of inequitable conduct,
with some important changes.153 The third category, the 2005 and
2008 versions, would have reduced the applicability of the inequitable
conduct defense in litigation and would shift the responsibility more
would further reduce certainty and increase delay. Indeed, some have argued that the Federal
Circuit should give deference to a district court’s claim construction rather than reviewing such
de novo. See Lauren Maida, Note, Patent Claim Construction: It’s Not a Pure Matter of Law, So
Why Isn’t the Federal Circuit Giving the District Courts the Deference They Deserve?, 30
CARDOZO L. REV. 1773, 1775, 1795-1801 (2009).
149. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 123.
150. See, e.g., Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-109hr2795ih/pdf/BILLS-109hr2795ih.pdf; Patent Reform
Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. (2006), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS109s3818is/pdf/BILLS-109s3818is.pdf; Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong.
(2007), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110hr1908ih/pdf/BILLS110hr1908ih.pdf; Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 3600, 110th Cong. (2008), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110s3600is/pdf/BILLS-110s3600is.pdf; Patent Reform
Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. (2009), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hr1260ih/pdf/BILLS-111hr1260ih.pdf; Patent Reform
Act of 2010, S. 515, 111th Cong. (2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS111s515is/pdf/BILLS-111s515is.pdf; Patent Reform Act of 2011, S. 23, 112th Cong. (2011),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112s23is/pdf/BILLS-112s23is.pdf.
151. There does not seem to be a partisan bias with respect to Patent Reform generally or
specifically with respect to the issue of inequitable conduct. For example, the 2009 Senate
version was a bipartisan effort by conservative Republican Senator Orin Hatch from Utah and
Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy from Vermont. Press Release, Senator Orrin Hatch, Senators
Hatch, Leahy Introduce Patent Reform Act of 2009 (Mar. 3, 2009), available at
http://hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2009/3/senators-hatch-leahy-introduce-patent-reformact-of-2009--.
152. See S. 3818; H.R. 1260.
153. See H.R. 1908.
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to the PTO to handle inequitable conduct allegations.154 The fourth
category, the 2010 version and the eventually passed 2011 version,
H.R. 1249 creates a “Supplemental Examination” proceeding before
the PTO designed to cure conduct that could be considered
inequitable after the issuance of the subject patent.155 Because of the
uncertain current state of the law and potential need for further
reform, each of the 2005, 2007, and 2008, versions is worth
examining separately.
a. The 2007 Version of Patent Reform
The 2007 version of patent reform (“2007 Version”) codified
substantial aspects of the common law inequitable conduct defense.156
Section 328 of the 2007 Version leaves the burden of proving
inequitable conduct by clear and convincing evidence on the
challenging party.157 While the House158 and Senate159 versions varied
in some respects, both substantially adopted the common law of
inequitable conduct. The 2007 Version required demonstration of
intent to deceive and precluded negligence or gross negligence as
being a sufficient showing for inequitable conduct.160 With respect to
materiality, it adopted the “prima facie case” standard.161 The 2007
Version did not mention the “sliding scale” standard of the common
law, instead simply requiring that both materiality and intent be
proven by clear and convincing evidence.162
While the substantive showing required for inequitable conduct
under the 2007 Version essentially codified common law, the
remedial component was more discretionary and flexible. It allowed a
court, in balancing the equities, to impose a choice of three remedies:
(1) denying equitable relief to the patent holder and limiting the
remedy for infringement to a reasonable royalty; (2) holding the

154. See S. 3600; H.R. 2795.
155. See S. 515; S. 23.
156. H.R. 1908 § 12 (amending § 282(c)).
157. Id. at § 6 (proposing § 328).
158. Democratic Congressman Howard Berman introduced the House Bill, H.R. 1908 on
April 17, 2007. This bill passed the House by a vote of 222-175 with 37 not present or not
voting. H.R. 1908.
159. Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy introduced the Senate Bill, S. 1145 on April 18,
2007. Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110s1145is/pdf/BILLS-110s1145is.pdf.
160. Id. at § 12 (proposing § 298(c)).
161. Id. at § 12 (proposing § 298(b)).
162. Id. at § 12 (proposing § 298(a)).
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claims in suit unenforceable or only the claims in which the
inequitable conduct occurred unenforceable; or (3) holding the patent
unenforceable.163
As discussed above, the application of the common law
inequitable conduct defense is problematic because of the
inconsistency of its application, in apparent exchange for discretion.
While there may be advantages to discretion—the disadvantages in
this circumstance outweigh the advantages. The lack of certainty put
applicants and prosecuting attorneys in too difficult of a position by
failing to provide notice—requiring them to guess, for example,
which materiality standard will be employed in litigation. It is
especially important to have a clearly defined standard of materiality
in light of case law holding that citing too much art, or failing to cite
sufficient art, could potentially lead to a finding of inequitable
conduct.164
Being an equitable doctrine, it is understandable that courts
would want to retain discretion in application of the inequitable
conduct doctrine.165 Paradoxically, under the common law there is
little discretion regarding the imposition of a remedy upon a finding
of inequitable conduct; at least all of the claims of the subject
patent—and possibly claims of related patents—are rendered
unenforceable.166
The 2007 Version provided the benefit of certainty by clarifying
the standard of materiality and omitting the uncertainty and analytical
problems associated with the sliding scale, with respect to the
substantive aspect of the inequitable conduct. However, it retained for
the courts discretion and flexibility to “do equity” in the remedial
component after a finding of inequitable conduct. Preferable to the
current common law, that version provided notice and certainty of
what was required of applicants and prosecuting attorneys, while
retaining discretion in the form of the remedy imposed after such a
finding is made.167

163. See id. at §12 (proposing § 298(e)).
164. See, e.g., Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn Co., 837 F. Supp.
1444, 1477 (N.D. Ind. 1992), aff’d without opinion, 11 F.3d 1072 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
511 U.S. 1128 (1994).
165. See, e.g., Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946).
166. See, e.g., Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 504 F.3d 1223, 1227-30 (Fed. Cir. 2007);
Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 n.15 (Fed. Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1067 (1989).
167. The 2007 Version also provides for the court to refer the matter to the PTO for
disciplinary action should it be shown that a prosecuting attorney or patent agent was involved
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b. The 2008 Version of Patent Reform
The 2008 version of Patent Reform (“2008 Version”) set forth
detailed procedures for the administration of the inequitable conduct
doctrine that primarily shifted the burden of determining inequitable
conduct from the courts to the PTO.168 Proposed section 298(a) of that
version provides that “[e]xcept as provided under this section or
section 299,169 a patent shall not be held invalid or unenforceable
based upon misconduct before the Office.”170 Proposed section
298(b)(1)(B) sets forth essentially a restrictive “but for” causation
requirement for materiality providing that “information is material if
it is not part of the record or cumulative to information in the record
and either establishes that a patent claim is not patentable or refutes a
position that the applicant or patent owner took in response to a
rejection of the claim as unpatentable.”171
The 2008 Version essentially deals with inequitable conduct
through special reissue proceedings in the PTO.172 The 2008 Version
provided a mechanism for a court to refer the matter to the PTO if
inequitable conduct charges arose during litigation.173 It provided that,
upon a motion by a party in litigation and a finding by the court that it
is more likely than not that a person “knowingly and intentionally
deceived the [PTO] by concealing material information or by
submitting false material information in such matter or proceeding,
the court shall order the patent to be made the subject of a reissue
application under [35 U.S.C.] section 251.”174 The 2008 Version then
set forth specific procedural guidelines for the special reissue
proceeding and potential appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal
Board.175

in inequitable conduct. Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 12 (2007)
(amending 282(c)(5)).
168. Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 3600, 110th Cong. (2008), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110s3600is/pdf/BILLS-110s3600is.pdf.
169. Id. § 11. Section 299 is discussed below and provides for civil sanctions for a
showing of inequitable conduct, as determined in a proceeding before the PTO.
170. S. 3600 § 11 (proposing § 298(a)). Proposed section 298(a) further clarifies that
“[n]othing in this section shall be construed to create a cause of action or a defense in a civil
action.” Id.
171. Id. (proposing § 298(b)(1)(B)). See also Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.,
649 F.3d 1276, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (generally adopting a “but for” causation
requirement but leaving open an undefined exception for “egregious misconduct”).
172. S. 3600 § 11 (proposing § 298(b)(1)(A)).
173. Id. (proposing § 298(b)(1)-(2)).
174. Id. (proposing § 298(b)(1)(A)).
175. Id. (proposing § 298(e)(5)(E)).
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The contemplated special reissue proceeding would have been ex
parte.176 Under the special reissue proceeding for inequitable conduct
allegations, claims may have been substituted or omitted, but they
could not be broadened—as claims may be under current 35 U.S.C.
section 251,177 within two years of the grant of the patent.178 The 2008
Version outlines procedural guidelines for the special reissue
proceedings and it allowed for discovery including production of
documents and depositions,179 as well as for an appeal from reissue
proceeding.180
The 2008 Version also provided for civil sanctions for
misconduct of prosecuting attorneys, patent examiners and parties to
an office proceeding, up to ten million dollars.181
The 2008 Version had advantages over the common law with
respect to reducing the distraction and cost generally associated with
an assertion of inequitable conduct during litigation by shifting that
burden to the PTO. However, shifting the burden to the PTO to
determine inequitable conduct—through the use of reissue
proceedings—raises additional concerns.
Proposed section 298(b)(4) of the 2008 version provided that a
court shall not stay the litigation proceedings after referral to the PTO
for the inequitable conduct reissue proceedings unless: (1) the
Director rejects at least one claim of the patent; (2) the allegations of
infringement remain pending in the litigation for at least one of the
rejected claims; and (3) the court determines that the interests of
justice require a stay.182 Thus, the parties may spend an abundance of
time and resources in litigation—only to have some or all of the
relevant claims rejected by the PTO—and consequently rendering
moot issues in litigation.183

176. Id. (proposing § 298(e)(5)(A)).
177. Id. (proposing § 298(f)). Current law also allows for ex parte reexamination, which
may be requested by anyone. 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2006). The reexamination is limited to
consideration of patents and printed publications not previously considered by the PTO,
however. 35 U.S.C. § 301 (2006). Inter partes reexamination is also available under current law
but it is not commonly requested by third parties because it gives rise to collateral estoppel. 35
U.S.C. § 315 (2006).
178. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2006). Current section 251 requires that the error sought to be
corrected by a reissue proceeding occur “without deceptive intention,” so it would not be
available under current law to cure a charge of inequitable conduct. Id.
179. S. 3600 § 11 (proposing § 299(c)).
180. Id. (proposing § 299(d)).
181. Id. (proposing § 299(b)(3)(C)).
182. Id. (proposing § 298(b)(4)).
183. Conversely, if a stay was the default rule after initiation of the inequitable conduct-
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The idea of parallel proceedings also creates a concern about
inconsistent results. A finder of fact in the litigation could determine
that an asserted claim of a patent was not invalid and the PTO could
still find that such claim was invalid in the reissue proceeding. 184 The
2008 Version was not clear regarding the consequences in such a
case. Presumably, the PTO’s determination of patentability would
trump that of the litigation fact finder, as the subject patent claim
would not issue from the PTO, and there would in effect retroactively
be no claim for the fact-finder to pass upon in the litigation.185 Under
the 2008 Version it appears that an accused infringer would have been
able to escape liability based on a finding of invalidity by convincing
either the PTO or the finder of fact in the litigation that the relevant
claims of the asserted patent were invalid.186 Thus, the reissue
proceeding would have likely become a common-place part of most
major patent litigation.187
Another disadvantage of the 2008 Version is the PTO, which is
already understaffed,188 would undoubtedly have to be expanded and
further funded to take on the additional responsibility of conducting
the reissue proceedings relating to a charge of inequitable conduct.189
Ultimately, the 2008 Version does not appear to have been a
good legislative reform choice with regard to inequitable conduct.
based reissue proceedings, an alleged infringer could most likely use the reissue proceedings as
a stall tactic. It is becoming more common for alleged infringers to seek ex parte reexamination
of asserted patents during litigation—most likely in part—for that same reason (it is at the
discretion of the district court whether to issue a stay pending reexamination of an asserted
patent in litigation).
184. See, e.g., Abbott Labs., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., No. C-08-4962-DLJ, 2009 WL
799404, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2009) (identifying problem of inconsistent findings by the
PTO and the court in different parallel proceeding context).
185. See S. 3600 § 11 (proposing § 298(e)(2) which provides that the reissue
proceedings—unless substitute claims are filed—shall “address only whether original claims
continue to be patentable after consideration of the additional information . . . .”).
186. No preference is stated for whether the special reissue would be before the same
examiner who examined the original application, when possible. See id. However, considering
the high turn-over rate of examiners it seems likely that the reissue proceeding would commonly
be conducted before a different examiner than the original application, who would of course
bring with him his own set of understandings, opinions, and bias, with respect to the
patentability of the invention—irrespective of the new information to be considered.
187. As mentioned above, the 2008 Version would require a motion to refer the matter to
the PTO but it only requires a preponderance of the evidence that material information was
withheld during the original prosecution, see id. § 298(b)(1)(A), and based on the amount of
resources spent during litigation compared to prosecution it is likely that an accused infringer
could regularly be successful on such a motion.
188. See John DeQ. Briggs, Intellectual Property & Antitrust: Two Scorpions in a Bottle,
10 SEDONA CONF. J. 65, 66 (2009).
189. See id.
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c. The 2005 Version of Patent Reform
The 2005 version of patent reform190 (“2005 Version”) would
have reduced191 the applicability and role in litigation of common law
inequitable conduct doctrine.192 Under the 2005 Version, as under the
2008 Version, the PTO would have been primarily responsible for
determining inequitable conduct193 (with the court retaining
jurisdiction in limited circumstances, addressed below).194 The PTO
would have had sole authority to administer sanctions for violations
by prosecuting attorneys or patent agents registered to practice before
the PTO.195
The 2005 Version also provided for the creation of a special unit
within the PTO to investigate allegations of inequitable conduct,196
and provided for certain discovery to occur and for appeal to the
Patent and Trademark Appeal Board.197 If inequitable conduct was
found to have occurred in a proceeding before the PTO, the PTO

190. Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-109hr2795ih/pdf/BILLS-109hr2795ih.pdf.
191. The proposed revisions would have eliminated the common law inequitable conduct
defense instead making it governed exclusively by the revised act. Id. § 5 (proposing § 136(a)
which provides “Any allegation of any type of violation of the duty of candor and good faith
under this subsection shall be governed exclusively by this chapter.”).
192. The proposed revisions provide that individuals associated with the filing of a patent
application have a duty of candor and that duty is violated if:
(1) the individual failed to disclose information or misrepresented information;
(2) the information not disclosed was material or, in the case of a
misrepresentation, the misrepresentation was material;
(3) the individual had knowledge of the materiality of the information not
disclosed or, in the case of a misrepresentation, of the misrepresentation and
materiality of the misrepresentation; and
(4) the individual had the intent to deceive or mislead.
Id. (proposing § 136(b)).
193. Id. Proposed § 136(c)(1) provides:
No court or Federal department or agency other than the Office, and no other
Federal or State governmental entity, may investigate or make a determination or
an adjudication with respect to an alleged violation of the duty of candor and
good faith under subsection (a) or with respect to an alleged fraud, inequitable
conduct, or other misconduct in any proceeding before the Office involving a
patent or in connection with the filing or examination of an application for patent,
except as expressly permitted in this section.
Id. § 136(c)(1).
194. Id. Proposed § 136(a) would have imposed the duty of candor on “individuals
associated with the filing and prosecution of an application for patent and on individuals
assisting a patent owner in proceedings before the Office involving a patent.” Id. § 136(a).
195. Id. (proposing § 136(e)(1)).
196. Id. (proposing § 136(e)).
197. Id. (proposing §§ 136(e)(2), (4)).
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could have issued a fine in an amount sufficient to deter future
violations, not to exceed one million dollars or five million dollars for
particularly egregious conduct, without affecting the enforceability of
the patent.198
The 2005 Version also imposed certain procedural requirements
before unenforceability for inequitable conduct could be asserted in
court.199 Unenforceability based on inequitable conduct could only be
raised by motion.200 Before such a motion could be granted, one or
more asserted claims would have to have been found invalid and
judgment entered on those claims.201 The 2005 Version directed that
the court may not grant the motion unless the PTO relied on one or
more material misrepresentations that are attributable to the patent
owner (and excluding conduct by patent agents or prosecuting
attorneys), which caused one or more invalid claims of the subject
patent to issue.202
Under the 2005 Version, assertions of unenforceability because
of inequitable conduct in litigation would have been reduced. By
delaying the timing of an assertion of inequitable conduct and
requiring at least one claim first be held invalid, some allegations of
inequitable conduct would become moot because it would be
unnecessary to find claims unenforceable if they are already invalid.
Unenforceability would only be an issue in litigation where one or
more claims were invalid but other claims of the subject patent were
both infringed and not invalid.203
5. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Various
Unpassed Versions of Reform Relating to Inequitable
Conduct
The precise effects of the “Supplemental Examination”
provisions, section 257 of United States Code, added by H.R. 1249
remain unclear. Consequently, further legislative reform might be
desirable. The following discusses the general advantages and

198. Id. (proposing § 136(e)(6)).
199. Id. (proposing § 136(d)(2)).
200. Id.
201. Id. See also Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1292 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (en banc) (holding that at least one claim of the patent at issue must be found to be
invalid before unenforceability due to inequitable conduct could be found).
202. H.R. 2795 § 5 (proposing 136(d)(2)(D)).
203. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(noting that under the current system inequitable conduct is alleged in nearly every major
litigation).

13 JOHNSON (DO NOT DELETE)

230

3/23/2012 11:26 AM

SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 28

disadvantages of the various proposed versions of patent reform,
including the current version, H.R. 1249.
a. Courts Should Retain Responsibility for
Administration of Unenforceability of an Issued
Patent with the PTO Having Sanctioning
Authority for Violations of the Duty of Candor
The ultimate determination of unenforceability due to
inequitable conduct should be left with the court, as set forth in the
2007 Version, rather than shifted to the PTO, as in the 2005 and 2008
versions, in order to avoid inconsistencies, delay, and other inherent
problems caused by parallel proceedings.204 The current law, H.R.
1249, passed in 2011 will probably increase proceedings before the
PTO in the form of Supplemental Examination but would not
dramatically decrease inequitable conduct during litigation because of
the limitation that the Supplemental Examination only provides for a
safe harbor if the supplemental examination request is completed
before inequitable conduct is charged in litigation.205
Practically speaking, a Plaintiff to a patent litigation suit might
not be aware of or be able to anticipate what the Defendants might
allege constitutes inequitable conduct. This creates an incentive for a
Defendant to make allegations of inequitable conduct before
obtaining all relevant factual information to prevent the Plaintiff from
availing itself of the Supplemental Proceedings safe harbor
provision.206 In reality, Plaintiffs, in major patent litigation, might
seek Supplemental Examination as a prophylactic measure,
unnecessarily increasing the burden on the PTO.
If the doctrine of inequitable conduct continues, it makes sense
to have the court rather than the PTO make the ultimate determination
because the court has been presented with all relevant information,
and because equity requires a determination based on all of the facts
surrounding a case.207
However, the PTO should continue to have sanctioning authority
for violations of the duty of candor and in fact this investigative and

204. See generally Abbott Labs., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., No. C-08-4962-DLJ, 2009 WL
799404, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2009) (identifying problem of inconsistent findings by the
PTO and the court in different parallel proceeding context).
205. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 12, 125 Stat.
284, 325-27 (2011) (codified in 35 U.S.C. § 257).
206. See id.
207. Cf. Holmberg v. Armbrehct, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946).
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sanctioning authority could be expanded as provided for by the 2005
and 2008 Versions.208 Potential monetary sanctions and disciplinary
action against those licensed to practice before the PTO have the
effect of providing incentives for compliance with rules but without
the concerns for the disproportionate remedy that accompany the
current form of unenforceability due to inequitable conduct in
litigation.209
b.

Materiality and Intent Should be Specifically Set
Forth and Defined

As discussed above, the Federal Circuit has recently attempted to
more clearly define materiality and intent requirements for a showing
of inequitable conduct.210 Unfortunately, the Court, while providing
general rules, has left gaping exceptions, such as an “egregious
misconduct” exception to materiality, which threaten to swallow the
rule.211
Under the current version of Patent Reform H.R. 1249,
inequitable conduct will most likely continue to be a major factor in
patent litigation because allegations of misconduct will be alleged
before a patent owner can request “Supplemental Examination” of the
subject patent.212
208. See Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 3600, 110th Cong. § 11(a) (2008), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110s3600is/pdf/BILLS-110s3600is.pdf;
H.R. 2795,
109th Cong. § 5 (2005), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS109hr2795ih/pdf/BILLS-109hr2795ih.pdf.
209. See Nicole M. Murphy, Note, Inequitable-Conduct Doctrine Reform: Is the Death
Penalty for Patents Still Appropriate?, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2274, 2274 (2009) (“Recent
application of the doctrine has been likened to ‘imposing the death penalty for relatively minor
acts of misconduct.’”) (citing Robert Pear, Candor at Heart of Debate over Patents in Congress:
Should Firms Lose Rights Won by Misrepresentation?, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 30, 2008, at
11)); Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2008),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 655 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[I]t is also inequitable to strike
down an entire patent where the patentee only committed minor missteps or acted with minimal
culpability or in good faith.”); Patent Reform: The Future of American Innovation: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 131 (2007) (statement of Jon W. Dudas,
Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office noting that uncertainty surrounding the inequitable-conduct doctrine creates the potential
for “draconian penalties” for innocent omissions); Paul M. Janicke, Inequitable Conduct: Out of
the
Frying
Pan?,
PATENTLY-O
(Aug.
7,
2008,
12:04
PM),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2008/08/inequitable-con.html
(“[C]redible-sounding
explanations” for innocent omissions by applicants years after a patent filing and application
“are not that easy to come by”).
210. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(en banc).
211. See id.
212. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 12, 125 Stat.
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If the inequitable conduct doctrine persists in patent litigation,
the 2007 Version’s requirements of a specific articulation of
materiality,213 and intent should be adopted. Such specificity provides
consistency and notice of requirements for compliance by prosecuting
attorneys, agents, and patentees in order to avoid the problems with a
lack of notice and uncertainty present in the common law application
of inequitable conduct, discussed above.214 Both intent and materiality
should be required to be separately proven by clear and convincing
evidence without regard to any sliding scale. As suggested by the
NAS Report, no inference should be drawn with respect to intent to
deceive based upon the degree of materiality.215 As addressed above,
materiality and intent are separate inquiries. There is no compelling
reason that a sliding scale should be used to diminish the requirement
of intent, or that an inference of intent should be drawn based on the
degree of materiality.
c.

Discretionary and Flexible Remedial Provisions
Are Desirable to the Rigid Remedies in the
Inequitable Conduct Context

The remedial provisions of the 2007 Version of Patent Reform
are favorable to a harsh rule because of the discretion it offers in the
choice of remedy after a finding of inequitable conduct.216 For
example, a court could decide to deny injunctive relief and require
that a certain percent of the royalty is paid in trust to the PTO rather
than to the patentee, where the court finds that although there was
inequitable conduct, it did not affect the validity of the patent. This
remedy would avoid a windfall to the infringer,217 while
284, 325-27 (2011) (codified in 35 U.S.C. § 257).
213. The 2007 Version adopts the “prima facie case” standard of materiality. See Patent
Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 12(b) (2007), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110hr1908ih/pdf/BILLS-110hr1908ih.pdf. It makes sense
to adopt the same standard of materiality for litigation that is used by the PTO—although the
Federal Circuit has made clear that it is not bound by the PTO’s rule in that regard. See
Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1293-94. Patentees and prosecuting attorneys should be in compliance
with litigation standards if they comply with the PTO rules and its current standard of
materiality. Ultimately, there may not be a real difference between the “reasonable examiner”
and “prima facie case” standards of materiality. The precise definition of materiality in this
regard is probably not as important as actually clearly adopting some workable definition in
order to give notice to patentees and their agents of requirements for conduct before the PTO.
214. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 639-40 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
215. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 123.
216. See Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 12 (2007), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110s1145is/pdf/BILLS-110s1145is.pdf.
217. There are other possible remedies that a court in equity may determine to be
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compensating the public in two ways. First, it would allow
competition by denying injunctive relief. Second, it would
compensate the PTO and in effect the public for the lack of full
disclosure during prosecution of the application, which violates the
“bargain” the patentee makes with the public of full disclosure in
exchange for a limited monopoly.218
d. Attorneys’ Fees
Finally, one issue that is not addressed by any of the patent
reform legislation, but that was raised by the NAS Report is the award
of attorneys’ fees.219
The general reasoning behind the “American Rule”, where each
party bears its own attorneys’ fees, is to prevent parties from being
dissuaded from bringing or defending meritorious claims because of
fear of being burdened with the opposing side’s attorneys’ fees,220
should the opposing party ultimately prevail.221 Awarding attorneys’
fees to the prevailing party as a matter of right when inequitable
conduct was asserted would probably not be desirable because of the
likelihood of chilling meritorious assertions and defenses. However
under 35 U.S.C. section 285, proof of inequitable conduct can form
the basis for the award of attorneys’ fees in favor of the accused
infringer if inequitable conduct makes the case exceptional.222
Therefore, if an attorneys’ fees provision was added to reduce
the frequency of inequitable conduct claims, in line with the NAS
Report, it would be advisable to include an explicit provision stating
that an unsuccessful assertion of inequitable conduct may make the
case exceptional, allowing the patentee to recover its attorneys’ fees
relating to an unsuccessful charge of inequitable conduct. However, a

appropriate after a finding of inequitable conduct. As another example, for minor violations, a
court may decide to deny lost profits but allow a full reasonable royalty.
218. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (“[T]he patent system
represents a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the creation and the public disclosure
of new and useful advances in technology, in return for an exclusive monopoly for a limited
period of time.”).
219. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 122.
220. Bregstone v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 507, 511 (1984).
221. Of course the high percentage of cases that are overturned on appeal suggests that
reasonable minds can vary on the ultimate merits of a case and a case certainly could be brought
in good faith but ultimately lost. For example, the Federal Circuit overturns roughly 40% of the
claim construction cases it hears on appeal. See DONALD W. RUPERT, COMMERCIAL LITIGATION
STRATEGIES: LEADING LAWYERS ON CASE PREPARATION, SETTLEMENT OPPORTUNITIES, AND
BEST PRACTICES FOR CLIENT SUCCESS (2008), available at 2008 WL 5939923 at *24.
222. See Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 455 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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finding that an assertion of inequitable conduct may make the case
exceptional should remain discretionary with the district court rather
than adopted as a matter of right, in order to align with case law.
If the procedural requirements of the 2005 Version were
adopted, an attorneys’ fees provision would be unnecessary.
Borderline assertions of inequitable conduct might be reduced by the
requirement of a finding that at least one claim is invalid and the
requirement that the district court grant a motion to allow an assertion
of the inequitable conduct defense in litigation.223
III. A PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE THE INEQUITABLE CONDUCT
DEFENSE BASED ON VARYING THE PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY,
DEPENDING UPON FULL DISCLOSURE
Both Congress224 and the Federal Circuit have recently taken
steps to reduce the role of inequitable conduct in patent litigation.225
The ultimate effect of these changes remains unclear, as discussed
above, but a better alternative would be to entirely eliminate the
doctrine of inequitable conduct from patent litigation and replace it
with an interpretation of 35 U.S.C. section 282 that the presumption
of validity of an issued patent only arises when all material
information was before the Examiner during prosecution of the issued
patent.226 This makes sense because the validity presumption is based
on the belief that governmental officials normally do their jobs but if
the Examiner was lacking material information he or she would not
be able to make an informed decision. That would also serve the
current purpose of the inequitable conduct doctrine by giving
incentive to provide all material information to the PTO to obtain the
presumption of validity.
The inequitable conduct defense arose as a result of a belief that
it was necessary to ensure the duty of candor in patent prosecution,
because of its nature as an ex parte proceeding.227 “When a patent has

223. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1292 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (en banc) (similarly holding that at least one claim must be invalidated by non-disclosed
art before inequitable conduct may be asserted).
224. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011)
(codified in various sections of 35 U.S.C.).
225. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1292.
226. This section provides in pertinent part: “A patent shall be presumed valid. . . . The
burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting
such invalidity.” 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).
227. Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (Rader, J., dissenting) (“Without doubt, candor and truthful cooperation are essential to an
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been examined and duly granted, judicial review must give due
weight to the presumption of validity. . . . The presumption of validity
is based on the presumption of administrative correctness of actions
of the agency charged with examination of patentability.”228
Importantly, under existing Federal Circuit precedent,229 the
“presentation at trial of additional evidence that was not before the
PTO does not change the presumption of validity or the standard of
proof, although the burden may be more or less easily carried because
of the additional evidence.”230 Therefore, even if material information
was not before the examiner during prosecution, the Federal Circuit
has ruled that there is still a presumption of validity of an issued
patent that must be overcome by clear and convincing evidence at
trial to find the subject patent invalid.231
In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,232 the United States
Supreme Court indicated that material information that was not before
the examiner during prosecution of a patent could render the
presumption of validity of an issued patent inapplicable, or at least
ex parte examination system. . . . The threat of inequitable conduct, with its ‘atomic bomb’
remedy of unenforceability, ensures that candor and truthfulness.”).
228. Applied Materials v. Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am., Inc., 98 F.3d 1563,
1569 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
229. Prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit, case law had held that when there was art
that was “closer to” the subject of the application that was introduced during litigation but was
not before the examiner the presumption of validity did not apply and the burden of proof for
showing validity rested with the patentee. See Tveter v. AB Turn-O-Matic, 633 F.2d 831, 833
(9th Cir. 1980); accord Photo Elecs. Corp. v. England, 581 F.2d 772, 775 (9th Cir. 1978); Deere
& Co. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 513 F.2d 1131, 1132 (9th Cir. 1975); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. TelDesign Inc., 460 F.2d 625, 628 (9th Cir. 1972). Of course whether a reference is “closer to” the
invention than art that was before the examiner does not necessarily coincide with whether the
art is material but it does recognize that the presumption of validity should be affected when the
examiner was not aware of certain information. See Tveter, 633 F.2d at 833. However, in Am.
Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1984), the Federal Circuit
specifically stated that it disagreed with that precedent and that the presumption of validity
attached to an issued patent could only be overcome by a showing of invalidity by clear and
convincing evidence, regardless of what information the examiner might have been lacking
when making a determination of patentability. Id. at 1359-60.
230. Applied Materials, 98 F.3d at 1569.
231. See id. There was a pre-Federal Circuit split among the circuits regarding the required
burden to overcome the presumption of validity of an issued patent with at least the Second
Circuit and the Sixth Circuit holding that only a preponderance of evidence was necessary.
Compare Dickstein v. Seventy Corp., 522 F.2d 1294 (6th Cir. 1975) (recognizing circuit split
and that some circuits required clear and convincing evidence), with Rains v. Niaqua, Inc., 406
F.2d 275, 278 (2d Cir. 1969) (“a preponderance of the evidence determines the issue”), and
Lorenz v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 305 F.2d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 1962) (indicating that a
preponderance of the evidence was sufficient). See also supra note 229 regarding the Ninth
Circuit’s varying burden depending upon what art was before the examiner.
232. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
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severely lowers the burden of overcoming the presumption.233
Following the Supreme Court’s lead, section 282 of the Patent Act234
should be interpreted so the presumption of validity depends upon
whether all non-cumulative material information was before the
examiner of the application resulting in the subject patent. If the
current requirement, that the presumption of validity must be
overcome by clear and convincing evidence, was seen as being
insufficient incentive for the patentee to provide all non-cumulative
material information to the examiner, the presumption could be raised
to require the accused infringer to show that the PTO’s decision to
grant the patent was arbitrary,235 or that the PTO’s decision to grant
the patent is not supported by substantial and competent evidence.
If non-cumulative material information was not before the
Examiner, one option would be to have the burden remain on the
challenging party to show invalidity by a mere preponderance of the
evidence. Alternatively, the burden could shift to the patentee236 to
show validity of the patent by a preponderance of the evidence if the
non-cumulative material information was not before the examiner
during litigation.237

233. See id. at 426.
234. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).
235. This standard would treat the PTO’s decision to grant the patent as an administrative
decision subject only to review under the highly deferential arbitrary and capricious standard
afforded administrative agencies, based upon the rationale that the agency is experienced in
dealing with its particular subject matter. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). When all non-cumulative material information is before the
examiner it might make sense to use such a highly deferential standard during litigation in
deference to the examiner’s expertise in the field.
236. Applied Materials v. Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am., Inc., 98 F.3d 1563,
1569 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Tveter v. AB Turn-O-Matic, 633 F.2d 831, 833 (9th Cir. 1980) (preFederal Circuit case law shifting the burden to the patentee to prove validity when “closer” art
was not before the examiner).
237. It would be a difficult judicial interpretation for a court to adopt a standard whereby
the patentee had the burden of proving validity where material information was not before the
examiner under the current version of section 282 which provides in part that “[t]he burden of
establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such
invalidity.” 35 U.S.C. § 282. That change would probably have to come from Congress.
Conversely, a differing standard, such as where a challenger during litigation bore the burden of
proving invalidity of an issued patent by a preponderance of the evidence if non-cumulative
material information was not before the examiner, instead bore the burden of proving invalidity
by a higher standard such as: (1) demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that the patent
should not have issued; (2) that there is no substantial evidence to support the issuance of the
patent; or (3) an appropriate court (the United States Supreme Court or the Federal Circuit en
banc) could rule that the decision to grant the patent was arbitrary and capricious without
legislative intervention because section 282 does not set forth an appropriate burden of proof for
a challenge to the validity of an issued patent.
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Regardless of which standard of proof is ultimately required, the
key would be to provide a sufficiently higher burden on the party
challenging validity during litigation to provide adequate incentive to
the patentee to disclose all non-cumulative material during
prosecution of the application. Indeed, the patentee would have more
incentive to provide material information to the examiner under the
proposed system,238 as under the current system neither the patentee
nor the attorney representing him has an obligation to search for
material prior art.239
In addition to providing the desired incentive to patentees to
disclose all non-cumulative material information, this varying burden
would also make sense logically because the examiner is more likely
to make the correct decision on patentability when she is in
possession of all material information. The precise burdens adopted
would then depend upon policy considerations regarding whether
more or less patents should ultimately be found invalid during
litigation,240 taking into account relevant desired societal incentives
for encouragement of innovation and the necessary burdens related
thereto.
Considering the positive effect on innovation that a strong patent
system provides, adopting the agency’s deferential standard of
238. Admittedly the severity of the result of not disclosing material information would not
be as great as in the current system. However, especially with respect to patent applications that
are likely to be litigated the incentive to receive the benefit of the presumption would likely be
sufficient, especially in conjunction with the threat of sanctions from the PTO for
noncompliance with disclosure obligations, to ensure disclosure of non-cumulative material
information. See 37 C.F.R. pt. 10, 11 (2010).
239. See Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(citing Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(“The mere possibility that material information may exist will not suffice to give rise to a duty
to inquire; sufficient information must be presented to the attorney to suggest the existence of
specific information[,] the materiality of which may be ascertained with reasonable inquiry.”));
id. (citing Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(“Nor does an applicant for patent, who has no duty to conduct a prior art search, have an
obligation to disclose any art of which, in the [district] court’s words, he ‘reasonably should be
aware.’”)).
240. This determination concerns an entirely separate issue of the policy of the desired
relative strength of patent protection and the effects thereof, which has been analyzed and
disputed at length by economists and legal scholars. See generally Shawn G. Hansen,
Perspectives on U.S. Patent Reform: The Next Steps are Crucial, in UNDERSTANDING PATENT
REFORM IMPLICATIONS: LEADING LAWYERS ON DEFINING KEY ISSUES, INTERPRETING
CURRENT PROPOSED LEGISLATION, AND PROJECTING FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 141, 141-74
(2009); see also Ian Ayres & Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradable Patent Rights, 60 STAN. L. REV.
863 (2007). The relative ease or difficulty of proving invalidity of an issued patent is one of the
most effective ways to alter the relative strength of the patent system, based on determined
desired incentives and burdens.
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requiring the challenging party to prove that the PTO’s decision to
grant the patent was arbitrary and capricious, or was not supported by
substantial and competent evidence if all non-cumulative material
information was before the examiner, and requiring the challenging
party to prove the patent is invalid by a mere preponderance of the
evidence if non-cumulative material information was not before the
examiner would probably be the best choice. This would provide
sufficient incentive for the patentee to provide all material
information to the PTO while protecting the integrity of the patent
system.241 That change in the law,242 if adopted, would make the
doctrine of inequitable conduct unnecessary.
Under the proposed new system, instead of the “atomic bomb”
inequitable conduct presents,243 the patentee would be provided with
an incentive to disclose all non-cumulative material art to the
examiner during prosecution of an application in order to obtain a
favorable burden of proof regarding validity during litigation of the
subject patent.244 during prosecution of an application in order to
241. If these burdens were adopted, that may not result in a substantially different number
of patents being held valid and enforceable than under the current system because the current
burden of proof of clear and convincing evidence, applied to all issued patents, falls somewhere
between the two proposed alternative burdens of proof. Moreover, the defense of inequitable
conduct is rarely successful so its elimination would not likely dramatically affect the number of
successful infringement actions. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418,
1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
242. The Federal Circuit has ruled that while the clear and convincing evidence standard
burden of proof never changes even when material information was not before the examiner, in
such a case, additional deference to the PTO’s decision is reduced or eliminated. See, e.g.,
Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 1984),
abrogated by Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en
banc).
When an attacker simply goes over the same ground traveled by the PTO, part of
the burden is to show that the PTO was wrong in its decision to grant the patent.
When new evidence touching validity of the patent not considered by the PTO is
relied on, the tribunal considering it is not faced with having to disagree with the
PTO or with deferring to its judgment or with taking its expertise into account.
The evidence may, therefore, carry more weight and go further toward sustaining
the attacker’s unchanging burden.
Id. The effect, if any, of this is unclear but it may not be a great enough incentive in itself to
cause patentees to seek out and disclose all material information to the examiner absent the
threat of inequitable conduct.
243. Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (Rader, J., dissenting).
244. Professor Mark Lemley has asserted that because the vast majority of patents never
get litigated, it is better that the PTO does not spend an abundance of time and resources
evaluating each application in what he calls “rational ignorance.” See Mark A. Lemley, Rational
Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1497 (2001). The proposed burden
shifting would facilitate that goal in the sense that patentees who know that the patent is likely to
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obtain a favorable burden of proof regarding validity during litigation
of the subject patent.
Of course this change would mean that the issue of whether noncumulative material prior art was not before the examiner would have
to be determined in litigation when the validity of the patent is
challenged in order to determine the appropriate burden on the issue
of validity.245 However, the issue of whether non-cumulative material
prior art was before the examiner is currently an issue in nearly every
major patent litigation as an element of an inequitable conduct
charge.246 At a minimum, the proposed new system would eliminate
the troublesome intent element of inequitable conduct, along with the
prejudice, burden, expense, unpredictability, and distraction
accompanied by an inequitable conduct allegation allowed for under
the current system.
IV. CONCLUSION
The strength of the presumption of validity of an issued patent
should depend on whether the Examiner who reviewed the
application was in possession of all non-cumulative material
information.247 In addition the inequitable conduct doctrine should be
eliminated as a defense in patent litigation because it would no longer
be a necessary incentive for the patentee to present all material
information to the Examiner during prosecution of a patent. The
incentive for full disclosure would come from the desire to receive a
favorable burden of proof relating to a challenge of the validity of the
issued patent during litigation.

never be litigated would probably not spend an abundance of resources searching out prior art
and overburdening the PTO with an abundance of references. Id. However, where a patent is
likely to be litigated the patentee would have incentive to seek out and submit all references,
allowing the PTO to spend most often its time examining patent applications that are likely to be
litigated. Id.
245. Because it would continue to be relevant, the definition of “materiality” should be
clarified and a single standard adopted so that patentees, litigants and prosecuting attorneys are
aware of what is required of them during prosecution of a patent application.
246. The determination of whether all non-cumulative information was before the
examiner might properly be determined by the court as a matter of law, possibly in conjunction
with a Markman proceeding. Claim construction bears on the issue of materiality and a
materiality determination would naturally follow from a Markman proceeding.
247. The growth of the inequitable conduct doctrine (and the arguable need therefore)
coincided with the change in case law that held that the presumption of validity, which must be
overcome by clear and convincing evidence, attached regardless of what information was not
before the examiner. See supra note 231.

